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Neuroscientific studies of intertemporal choice (IC) have focused mainly on the neural repre-
sentation of self-control mechanisms and valuation.This reflects what has been considered
as the core of the IC phenomenon.The claim of this paper is that deviations from exponen-
tial reward discounting as a function of time might be fully accounted for by the deviation
of subjective time from calendar time. This claim is based on evidence that specificities of
time perception can modulate discounting. Consequently, time perception is fundamental
to IC and it is crucial to understand the mechanisms underlying time processing in different
situations; to investigate when human time perception differs from time as represented
by the calendar metric system; and to study how time perception predicts choices. This
paper surveys the recent literature on time perception in order to discuss the measuring
of IC through time-perception specificities. The notion of self is also discussed within this
temporal perspective. If time perception modulates discounting, and time perception is
related to self, the relationship between self and time perception becomes a new path to
be explored in the IC studies.
Keywords: human time perception, discounting, self-referential processing
INTRODUCTION
An extensive literature in economics has explored the sources and
consequences of the daily difficulties we experience when making
intertemporal choices (IC), that is, decisions in which the moment
of choice and the associated consequences are separated in time.
The way humans discount values through time continues to moti-
vate investigation into the mathematical representation that best
fits real decisions (e.g., Benhabib et al., 2010; Ray and Bossaerts,
2011; Takeuchi, 2011). The observed pattern of delayed value dis-
counting has also been explained in terms of procrastination (e.g.,
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2000), self-control problems (e.g., Laib-
son, 1997), the multiple-selves perspective (e.g., Ainslie, 1992), the
visceral factor hypothesis (Loewenstein, 1996), and projection bias
when predicting future utilities (Loewenstein et al., 2003).
Neuroscience can potentially increase the precision of the para-
meters of existing models. It can also propose new and important
elements to the explanation of IC. This paper argues that an aspect
relevant to the study of IC – human time perception – has not
received enough attention. If the specificities of time perception
are intrinsic to the patterns displayed in IC behavior, how can our
models take account of this?
Currently, neuroscientific studies on IC have focused mainly
on the neural correlates of self-control and reward evaluation.
This reflects what is considered to be the core of the IC phe-
nomenon in economics; hence, time perception does not seem to
be included. Delay is usually assessed by observing the activation
of other mechanisms, such as those known to underlie impul-
sive behavior (e.g., Roesch et al., 2006). Now, if time perception
were considered intrinsic to IC, one could expect that experiments
would be designed first of all to study the mechanisms that underlie
time processing in different situations, and how the operation of
these mechanisms predicts choices.
In fact, the analysis of human time perception shows wide
variation in time processing, presently overlooked by the stan-
dardized metrics of time assumed by IC research. One week from
now may be perceived as longer than the same period of 7 days
1 year from now. Therefore, either number followed by the word
“days,” “months,” or “years” might not be sufficient to account
for variations in temporal discounting. Different ways of reading
experimental results, according to these different metrics, can lead
to quite different interpretations of the data. This paper discusses
the consequences of these variations.
The paper is organized as follows: Section “The Nature of the
IC Phenomenon” shows that IC research has not given time pro-
cessing mechanisms a central role, and explains why it should;
Section “Time Perception in the Brain” surveys evidence show-
ing divergences between time perception in humans and cal-
endar time, and outlines studies that analyze the accuracy of
models of IC when psychological features of time perception
are taken into account. The Section “Are Time Perception, Self,
and Discounting Related?” discusses two potential basic compo-
nents of discounting: human time perception, but also, the notion
of self.
THE NATURE OF THE IC PHENOMENON
In IC situations, people tend to prefer immediate satisfaction over
a delayed and bigger reward. Farsighted behavior is more than
a normative feature of decision making theory. People believe
they will be able to wait. However, faced with the situation – the
future becomes the present time – they behave in a shortsighted
way. Hence, IC creates the conditions for the emergence of behav-
ior that is incompatible with the long-term declared interests of
the individual. Thus, a first condition for the emergence of this
inconsistency is the introduction of an interval of time. Such an
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interval permits the operation of cognitive biases, and tempo-
ral and hedonic distortion of prospective scenarios; it gives rise
to internal conflict between future and present interests; and it
makes pertinent risks and uncertainties related to future. Thaler
(1981, p. 205) reported empirical data supporting the difference
between today and tomorrow to be more important than that
between 1 year, and 1 year and 1 day. This idea had also been men-
tioned in Strotz (1956), almost three decades earlier. Therefore, the
possibility that time does not follow a static scale in human per-
ception in IC is not a novelty. Still, studies tackling basic features
of time perception have received far less attention in economics –
and more recently in neuroscientific studies on economics – than
those aiming to directly test IC’s functional forms.
In general, time in economics has been represented on a fixed
scale, so 1 day strictly means 24 h. According to empirical data,
however, “today” doesn’t have the same weight as any other day,
and this affects the output of decisions. Today is not simply the
aggregate of 24 h, but a word with a visceral meaning. This con-
cept embraces physiological needs and a precise schedule, it is
involved in recent memories, and it is prone to contextual influ-
ences. This fact is not completely ignored by economists. Features
of the particular way in which humans perceive time have always
been documented in economic studies of IC. One example is
the notion of “diminishing sensitivity,” according to which our
perception of changes in magnitude follows a concave function
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Another is the “reference-level
effect,” proposed by Rabin (1998), in which marginal changes are
perceived as having a specific time t as parameter, usually the
present. Finally, the phenomenon of present bias, or a thoughtless
preference for immediate satisfaction, is well accepted in the eco-
nomic literature (see among recent papers Benhabib et al., 2010;
Walther, 2010; Takeuchi, 2011).
Evidence indicates that distortions in prospection might be
directly modulated by time. If the introduction of an interval of
time triggers a different dynamic in decision making, time should
be at the core of IC phenomenon. If this were a consensus, one
main question would be “how is discounting modulated by vari-
ations in the perception of time?” The prevailing usage of the
metrics without further specification (i.e., “6 months,” “5 years,”
“present and future”) doesn’t allow us to distinguish how different
temporal intervals affect decision making. There is a gap between
human time perception and the standard metrics. The next section
addresses this theme.
TIME PERCEPTION IN THE BRAIN
EVIDENCE: HUMAN TIME PERCEPTION DIFFERS FROM CALENDAR
TIMESCALE
How long does present time last? Just by changing the inter-
vals of the discounting task protocol, a phenomenon, so-called
future bias, challenges the limits of the “present” (e.g., Gerber and
Rohde, 2010; Takeuchi, 2011). While the widely observed present
bias implies a decreasing impatience through time (denoting a
preference for the immediately available reward), the future bias
represents the contrary, an increasing impatience. This phenome-
non occurs during a specific interval and it is only detected when
the first delay is short (e.g., 22 days in Takeuchi’s study, instead of
3 months in Thaler (1981)’s protocol). Notwithstanding, present
bias still occurs – forming an inverse S-curve, concave for the
first days and convex thereafter. So, to illustrate it, let us assume
that a nice event is going to happen very soon (a fancy dinner, a
great monetary bonus, a nice concert). As the time of the event
gets closer, individuals feel more and more impatient (increasing
impatience – future bias). When delivery is imminent, individu-
als show a strong preference for receiving it immediately. But if
the delivery of the reward is postponed, people tend to be less
impatient as the delay becomes longer (decreasing impatience –
present bias). Therefore, if the first delay is long enough, empirical
data will show only the present bias, while a shorter delay can
reveal the growing expectation for the delivery of the reward. As
claimed by Takeuchi (2011), this first period would be a kind of
“extended present” and leads the author to ask when the future
really begins. Intuitively, present time can be longer than “now” or
“today.”
If the present can be “extended,” the future can be felt as less
remote. At least, this is a possible interpretation of an increas-
ing number of neuroscientific studies that attempt to understand
the role of prospective thinking and memory in temporal pref-
erence. These studies have shown that thinking about the future
in a precise context in a way that we can associate with storage
memories (i.e., my birthday the next year) reduces discounting.
An empirical test using fMRI (Peters and Büchel, 2010) brought
about an “episodic condition” where they used real information,
obtained from subjects in a pre-scan interview, about specific
future events planned for the day of the reward delivery. As
expected, results showed that discounting is modulated by episodic
future event cues. A similar idea already appeared in econom-
ics; Read et al. (2005) found lower discounting rates in subjects’
responses when the date in the future was specified, i.e., on “3rd
July” instead of “3 months from here,” or “1 year from now” and
so on.
In fact, an important literature (for a review, see e.g., Schacter
and Addis,2007) claims that episodic future simulation (imagining
the future) draws on episodic memory [the capacity to remember
experienced past events (Tulving, 2002)] and that the two share
neural correlates. Moreover, recent results indicate that informa-
tion relevant for the future might be preferentially selected in
memory consolidation (information that is sent to “long-term
storage”) during resting or sleep (Dragoi and Tonegawa, 2011;
Wilhelm et al., 2011).
Thus, a 20-year period may appear infinitely uncertain, but
being 60 years old is easier to conceive. The representation of
timescale divided into days, months, and years is methodologi-
cally easier, but ignores the real sense of time for human beings
and neglects an important feature necessary for understanding
subjective value formation. In fact, in standard economic analysis,
the measure of time is rarely divided into days, months, and years.
The Marshallian partial equilibrium framework introduced func-
tional definitions for different periods of time. The “short” and the
“long terms,” according to this view, are defined by the variables
which are allowed to adjust for the optimal solution, and not by
specific time intervals; whereas the adjustment process is predom-
inantly governed by marginal utility (demand) in the short term,
it is the cost of production (supply) that determines equilibrium
in the long run (Marshall, 1920, book V). In addition, from an
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evolutionary perspective, the introduction of the current calendar
is recent. It is not difficult to imagine that “seasons” have a more
tangible meaning than “months” for rural-based societies, even
nowadays.
EVIDENCE: BIOLOGICALLY PLAUSIBLE VIEWS OF TIME PERCEPTION
Elaborating more subtle distinctions, like near and far future (Eber
and Prelec, 2007), or distinguishing between the notions of psy-
chological and physical time (Kim and Zauberman, 2009; Ray
and Bossaerts, 2011), seem to be promising research strategies for
uncovering the way people actually make decisions. Following this
approach, there is a search for the principles underlying human
time perception. Ray and Bossaerts (2011), for instance, assume
that calendar time differs from the internal representation of time
in humans. Named “biological time,” this internal chronological
perception is said to vary randomly from calendar time, though,
naturally, the way people discount future values follows biologi-
cal time. Thus, choices that are biological time-consistent to the
individual appear time-inconsistent to an external observer who
bases their judgment of time on calendar time. Consequently, dis-
counting rates are better represented by a hyperbolical functional
format. Nonetheless, when biological time is accurate according
to calendar time, discounting takes the exponential form. Other
authors, however, have shown that the relation between time per-
ception and calendar time is not random; instead, it follows a
precise pattern. Takahashi et al. (2008) tested models including
psychophysical effects [a stimuli-response relation resulted from
investigations on the measurement of sensation (Stevens, 1975)].
The models based on Weber–Fechner’s law [the relation between
stimulus and subjective response is logarithmic (Stevens, 1975)]
and Steven’s law [a power law according to which equal stimu-
lus ratios produce equal sensation ratios (Stevens, 1975)] fit the
behavioral data better than the hyperbolic and exponential mod-
els. Cui (2011) specifies when Weber’s law (the linear growth of
variability in judgments is a function of the stimulus measure) is
valid in time and value perception. Despite variations, this line
of research stems from humans’ actual perception of time, rather
than from calendar time.
In neuroscientific studies, time perception has usually been
analyzed in combination with attention (Kagerer et al., 2002;
Wittmann and Paulus, 2007), emotion (Berlin and Rolls, 2004;
Geoffard and Luchini, 2010), and working memory (Lewis and
Miall, 2006). This latter relies on a literature that associates
(increasing levels of) dopamine with (acceleration of) subjective
time. Cheng et al., 2007, p. 149) explain that the ability to dis-
criminate durations in the seconds-to-minutes range “is a form
of temporal cognition that requires an optimal level of dopamin-
ergic function in cortico-striatal circuits in order to control time
sharing and regulate clock speed.”
Yet, time perception has traditionally been studied in the con-
text of impulsiveness. The idea of an internal representation of
time appears in a classic paper by Barratt (1983), a major reference
in psychophysiological and neurocognitive research on impulsiv-
ity, which names the widely used scale for impulsive behavior BIS,
the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. According to the author, individ-
ual differences in (the speed of) one’s subjective sense of time
are related to impulsiveness (Barratt, 1983). Wittmann and Paulus
(2007) claim that impulsive people overestimate the duration of a
given period of time, resulting in heavier discounting of delayed
rewards. The same idea is found in Takahashi et al. (2008). Both
studies rely on theoretical reviews that associate neuropsychi-
atric and neurological disorders, whose main behavioral feature
is impulsivity, with impaired time perception. Similarly, Berlin
and Rolls (2004) found that impulsivity was correlated with time
perception for all participants (both for borderline personality
disorder patients, and control group).
So the design of experiments on IC assumes a common time
frame taken from the calendar, whereas real time, as experienced
by people, may have several modalities. This neglect may lead to
misrepresentation of the real processes underlying IC. IC research
should incorporate time perception and its dynamic into models
of reward valuation mechanisms. The empirical literature sur-
veyed above indicates that even if hyperbolic functional formats
have fitted the data, when components of human time perception
are considered, other functional representations can be argued
to fit the data better. This can be the (often judged as unrealis-
tic) classic exponential format (as in Ray and Bossaerts, 2011),
or the Weber–Fechner discounting model with non-linear tempo-
ral cognition due to psychophysical effects (as in Takahashi et al.,
2008).
ARE TIME PERCEPTION, SELF, AND DISCOUNTING RELATED?
When we acknowledge the involvement of time-processing speci-
ficities proper to the agents within the IC, two promising research
directions appear: (1) time perception modulates discounting (a
subject developed throughout this paper), as part of the biologi-
cal basis of IC performance; and (2) relating the notion of self to
discounting, in the specific context of time perception.
How are self and time related? For Wittmann (2009, p. 1955),
time is a function of the self. Considering that time is felt in
absence of a specific sensory organ; and taking as a standpoint
that a single interval of time can seem long or short depending
on subjective well-being, time would be a construction of the self
(see Wittmann’s (2009) for a discussion of theoretical and empir-
ical bases of this notion). Let us add to this thesis the assumption
that intention is an essential component of the self. In light of this
idea, Haggard et al.’s (2002) study offers an empirical illustration
of a possible link between self and time perception, where subjects
must estimate the duration of a time interval after intentional and
non-intentional acts. Using Libet’s paradigm, it is shown that esti-
mation of the time interval between an action (pressing a button)
and a consequence (a tone) changes depending on whether the
act is voluntary or involuntary [the latter condition is generated
by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)]. In both cases, vol-
untary and involuntary acts are performed by the subjects – their
finger presses the button – so the difference between the cases
is mainly the presence of an intention (or yet we could call it a
self-generated act in opposition to an involuntary act caused by
TMS). The experiment suggests that intention, as component of
the self, changes the subject’s time estimation. It remains unknown
to which extent the most frequently used time perception tasks
(estimation, production, and reproduction) involve different cog-
nitive processes. While in the time estimation tasks (as in Haggard
and colleagues’ study) the subject must evaluate the duration of
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an external cue (a stimulus), in the time production tasks the
subject must self-generate a specific duration indicated by the
experimenter. In the third kind, the subjects are required to repro-
duce the duration of a stimulus. The extent to which the self is
implicated in the experience of time in these three tasks remains
to be understood.
How are self and discounting related in the context of time?
Lack of sensitivity to one’s own future-self may be the basis of
the preference for present satisfaction. According to Mitchell et al.
(2011), whether a person has an impaired perception of her future-
self or not is reflected in the activity of the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC), a region associated with self-referential process-
ing. The disparity between VMPFC’s activity when one thinks
about oneself in the present versus in the future represents the
degree of misperception of the future-self, according to these
authors. They found that patience levels and activation of VMPFC
were correlated. In addition, as predicted, these results were highly
correlated with choices on the IC task.
This “neural signature” of self-referential processing is good
news, from a methodological view, for the prospects of testing
the hypothesis that self- and time-perception are components of
discounting.
CONCLUSION
Two plausible components of IC were identified on the basis of rel-
evant evidence. In consequence, two research paths are suggested:
(1) to measure IC through time-perception specificities and (2) to
further investigate how discounting can be modulated by the level
of the notion of self within the agent. The idea of attributing a
central role to time-processing mechanisms seems promising on
biological grounds, whereas the second hypothesis, i.e., the notion
of self, would need further investigation.
Hyperbolic functions are consistent with empirical data, but
models that consider psychophysical effects or a biological per-
ception of time have been shown to fit the data better. The present
approach consists, then, in explaining behavior from a tempo-
ral perspective, supported by neuroscientific findings about the
underlying neural mechanisms of time perception and the notion
of self.
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